Gang Expression on the Internet: Florida Statutes Section 874.11 is a Violation of First Amendment Rights by Kube, Christina
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 59 
Issue 4 Summer 2010 Article 10 
2010 
Gang Expression on the Internet: Florida Statutes Section 874.11 
is a Violation of First Amendment Rights 
Christina Kube 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Christina Kube, Gang Expression on the Internet: Florida Statutes Section 874.11 is a Violation of First 
Amendment Rights, 59 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1199 (2010). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol59/iss4/10 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
NOTE
GANG EXPRESSION ON THE INTERNET: FLORIDA
STATUTES SECTION 874.11 IS A VIOLATION OF
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
Christina Kube+
In Reno v. ACLU, former-Justice John Paul Stevens recognized the
expansiveness of the Internet, declaring, "Through the use of [Internet] chat
rooms, any person with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that
resonates farther than it could from any soapbox."1  In today's digital world,
2the Internet plays a central role in the lives of many Americans. Protected by
the First Amendment, everything from clashing political viewpoints to family
vacation pictures are splattered across the web. At its best, the Internet
provides a voice for millions around the world. However, this "digital
freedom" creates a challenging question: should there be limits on what can be
transmitted legally over the Internet?
3
+ J.D. and Certificate Candidate, Institute for Communications Law Studies, May 2011, The
Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.A., 2007, University of Mary
Washington. The author would like to thank Professor Donna Gregg for her guidance and insight
throughout the writing process. The author would also like to thank her family and friends for
their support, Eddie for his unending patience and encouragement, and the staff of the Catholic
University Law Review for its hard work and dedication.
1. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
2. See, e.g., ECON. & STATISTICS ADMIN. & NAT'L TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN., U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A NATION ONLINE: ENTERING THE BROADBAND AGE 4 (2004),
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/anol/NationOnlineBroadband04.pdf (noting that over fifty
percent of households in the United States had access to the Internet in October 2003). According
to Pew Internet's 2009 report, sixty-three percent of adult Americans had broadband Internet
access as of April 2009. JOHN HORRIGAN, PEW INTERNET AND AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, HOME
BROADBAND ADOPTION 2009 3 (2009), http://www.pewintemet.org/Reports/2009/10-Home-
Broadband-Adoption-2009.aspx?r= I.
3. See, e.g., Jessica Meyers, Students' Rights Turn Tricky Online: Social Networking Sites
Make It Hard for Schools to Monitor Speech, But Not Infringe Upon It, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Nov. 19, 2009, available at http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/city/
collin/frisco/stories/DN-fronline_ 19met.ART.Central.Editionl .4b78ab3.html (noting that a Texas
middle school recently gained attention after suspending two students for posting threatening
remarks about their teacher on their personal Facebook pages, and questioning whether the
school's regulation of students' personal pages was a violation of First Amendment free-speech
rights).
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Reflecting the trend of digital expression, some criminal gangs have turned
to the Internet as a means of identifying themselves within their communities.4
While gang activity in the digital world may be a relatively new phenomenon,
the presence of gangs within communities across the country is not. According
to a recent study, some three thousand jurisdictions across the United States
5reported the presence of gang activity in 2001. Fearing greater levels of gang
proliferation and violence resulting from gang activity on the Internet, some
lawmakers are taking active measures to prevent the spread of gang-related
activity online.
6
Facing the growing problem of gang activity in Florida, 7 the state legislature
sought to combat gang proliferation on the Internet by enacting a statute
prohibiting gang-affiliated promotion via electronic-communication outlets.
8
4. See, e.g., Andrew Glazer, Authorities Say Gangs Using Internet, WASH. POST, July 6,
2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/06/AR2006070600886.
html (finding that some of the country's most prominent criminal gangs, including the Crips and
Bloods, have engaged in "web bang[ing]" on the Internet). The Florida Department of
Corrections defines a criminal gang as
A formal or informal ongoing organization, association, or group that has as one of its
primary activities the commission of criminal or delinquent acts, and that consists of
three or more persons who have a common name or common identifying signs, colors,
or symbols, including, but not limited to, terrorist organizations and hate groups.
Florida Dep't of Corr., Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/gangs/
faq.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2009).
5. ARLEN EGLEY, JR. & ALINE K. MAJOR, HIGHLIGHTS OF THE 2001 NATIONAL YOUTH
GANG SURVEY 1 (2003), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/fs20030l.pdf, Bureau
of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't. of Justice, Homicide Trends in the U.S., http://www.
ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/circumst.htm (last visited July 28, 2010) (noting that the amount of
gang-related violence has increased "almost 8 fold [sic] since 1976").
6. See, e.g., Press Release, Michael Bond for Congress, Bond Bill to Reduce Online Gang
Activity (May 15, 2009), http://www.bond2010.com/news/releases/ (last visited Dec. 9, 2009).
Illinois State Senator Michael Bond sponsored a bill that was proposed in an effort to prevent
gangs from using the Internet as a method of organization. Id. The bill was signed into law on
August 11,2009. See 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 2605-580 (2010).
7. See Natalie Neysa Alund, First State Gang Reduction Task Force Meets, BRADENTON
HERALD, Sept. 9, 2008, at 2C (discussing the efforts of a Florida regional gang task force, the
first of eight task forces created as part of the Florida Gang Reduction Strategy, to effectively
address the growing problem of street gangs within Florida); Shanique Palmer, Conference
Tackles Jamaican Violence, S. FL. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2008, available at
http://www.sfltimes.com/index2.php?option=comcontent&do df=-1&id 1753 (stating that
Florida has the fastest-growing gang population in the United States); Teri Pinney, Taking a
Stand Against Violence, TCPALM, Nov. 7, 2008, http://www.tcpalm.
com/news/2008/nov/07/teri-pinney-taking-stand-against-violence (reporting that a Florida school
rescheduled a football game from Friday evening to Saturday morning in response to the growing
problem of criminal gang rivalries).
8. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 874.11 (West 2009). Florida officials are actively combating the
state's gang problem, introducing several initiatives beyond the Intemet-related regulations that
are the focus of this Note. For example, Bill McCollum, Florida's Attorney General, introduced a
statewide strategy to address the growing gang problem. BILL McCOLLUM, FLORIDA GANG
REDUCTION STRATEGY 2008-2012, at i (2008). The initiative is designed to curb the influence of
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By imposing prohibitory regulations on online gang-related expression,
however, legislation may encroach on fundamental liberties guaranteed by the
First Amendment. 9
Recognizing the importance of protecting free speech and expression, then-
Justice Hugo Black stated, "[t]he very reason for the First Amendment is to
make the people of this country free to think, speak, write and worship as they
wish, not as the Government commands."' 10 The right of free expression,
regardless of content, was extended in Reno v. ACLU, where the Supreme
Court held that the protections of the First Amendment extend to speech
transmitted via electronic communications."l
Florida Statutes section 874.1 ]-enacted in October 2008-criminalizes
gang promotion in any form via the Internet. 12  Under the statute, any
individual who uses electronic communications, including the Internet, "for the
purposes of benefiting, promoting, or furthering the interests of a criminal gang
... to intimidate or harass other persons" is guilty of a third-degree felony.'
The newly enacted statute poses a particularly interesting challenge to First
Amendment principles because it involves a unique combination of
circumstances: crime prevention, free expression, and the Internet. Notably,
the legality of the statute has already been questioned by three Florida
defendants who challenged their indictments under it. 4 Facing up to five years
gangs and make communities safer by combating gang violence. Id, at ii. According to
McCollom, the initiative will accomplish these goals by "[s]top[ping] the growth of criminal
gangs in Florida; . . .[r]educ[ing] the number of gangs and gang members; [and] render[ing]
gangs ineffectual." Id. at 9.
9. See generally Thomas A. Myers, The Unconstitutionality, Ineffectiveness, and
Alternatives of Gang Injunctions, 14 MICH. J. RACE & L. 285, 294 (2009) (discussing the
appropriate level of scrutiny that must be applied to gang injunctions to determine whether they
violate the First Amendment). Myers' article discusses the increasing use of gang injunctions by
courts throughout the United States and whether such injunctions are an effective means of
combating gang presence in communities. Id. at 287. Myers claims that broadly-drawn gang
injunctions can create constitutional problems because they allow for the possibility of abuse by
law enforcement officers and unnecessarily burden the rights of freedom of expression and
association. Id. at 290, 294-95. Myers also questions the governmental interest in gang
injunctions by highlighting statistics demonstrating their ineffectiveness. Id. at 296-97. Finally,
he explores combating gang activity through the promotion of gang intervention and local
community initiatives. Id. at 300-01. According to Myers, cities that do not concentrate on using
gang injunctions to combat gang-related crime, like New York, report fewer gang-related crimes
than cities that use "heavy-handed suppression tactics." Id. at 300.
10. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 788 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting)
(discussing the unconstitutionality of compelling workers to contribute to a fund that supports
political groups the workers themselves do not support).
11. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844,885 (1997).
12. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 874.11.
13. Id.
14. See Lee County, FL Clerk of Court, State of Florida vs Figueroa-Santiago, Richard
Omar, Felony Case Detail Information, http://www.leeclerk.org/Criminal detailnew.asp?Cs
Num=08-CF-021458&CsType=Adult%20-%2OFelony# (last visited July 28, 2010) [hereinafter
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in prison for posting gang-related images on their personal MySpace pages, the
defendants claimed that enforcement of the statute violated their First
Amendment rights.
5
This Note explores the constitutionality of the newly enacted Florida statute
prohibiting criminal gang expression on the Interet. First, this Note discusses
the standards utilized by courts when examining regulations that potentially
encroach on the guarantees of the First Amendment. Second, this Note traces
the development of First Amendment jurisprudence regarding offensive speech
and conduct. This examination includes a discussion of cases that address hate
speech and gang activity in public forums and ways that courts have chosen to
interpret the scope of First Amendment protection in those instances. Third,
this Note briefly addresses the issue of obscenity and the Internet and the First
Amendment protections courts have extended to such expression. Fourth, this
Note examines the parameters of the newly enacted Florida statute and
discusses recent litigation under the new law. Fifth, this Note explores the
constitutionality of the statute by analyzing the statute under the appropriate
judicial standard-strict scrutiny-and comparing it to similar statutes at issue
in prior cases. Finally, this Note concludes that the Florida statute prohibiting
criminal gang expression on the Internet is overbroad and vague in its
application, and therefore violates an individual's constitutionally protected
right to freedom of expression.
I. THE SCOPE OF FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION: LIMITS TO THE FREEDOM
OF EXPRESSION
A. Establishing a Standard of Review for Examining the Regulation of Speech
The First Amendment states, in relevant part, "Congress shall make no law
• ..abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."'16 Because the First
Figueroa-Santiago Case Detail]; Lee County, FL Clerk of Court, State of Florida vs Rodriguez,
Elvis Eladio, Felony Case Detail Information, http://www.leeclerk.org/Criminaldetailnew.asp?
CsNum=08-CF-021458&CsType=Adult%20-%2OFelony# (last visited July 28, 2010)
[hereinafter Rodriguez Case Detail]; Lee County, FL Clerk of Court, State of Florida vs Soto,
Obduella David, Felony Case Detail Information, http://www.leeclerk.org/Criminal-detail-new.
asp?CsNum=08-CF-021455&CsType=Adult%20-%2OFelony (last visited July 28, 2010)
[hereinafter Soto Case Detail]; see also Steven Beardsley, Poll: Are Gang-Related Web Postings
Illegal? Judge Listens to Arguments, NAPLESNEWS.COM, Aug. 4, 2009, http://www.naplesnews.
com/news/2009/aug/04/are-gang-related-web-postings-illegal-judge-listen/.
15. Bardsley, supra note 14; Editorial: Gangs and the Internet .. .Judge's Probing
Questions Just What New Law Needed, NAPLESNEWS.COM, Aug. 6, 2009,
http://www.naplesnews.com/news/2009/aug/06
/editorial-gangs-and-intemet-judges-probing-questi/. MySpace is a free social networking service
that "allows Members to create unique personal profiles online in order to find and communicate
with old and new friends." Myspace.com, Terms of Use Agreement, http://www.myspace.com
/index.cfmfuseaction-misc.terms (last visited Nov. 18, 2009).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931)
(holding that "the Fourteenth Amendment embraces the right of free speech" and states are
1202 [Vol. 59:1199
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Amendment's language is so broad, courts have engaged in expansive
interpretation when determining the scope of its protections. 17  Perhaps
because of this expansive range of protection, American citizens have grown to
appreciate freedom of expression as one of the most paramount fundamental
rights, rising above other constitutional guarantees.' 8  As a central tenet of
American democratic principles, the freedom of expression is necessary to
maintain the democratic balance between solidarity and discrepancy among
differing viewpoints. 
1 9
An individual's freedom of speech, however, is not absolute; the
government may limit the protections of the First Amendment for certain
classes of expression which abuse the guarantees of the First Amendment.
20
For example, courts have declined to extend First Amendment protection to
thereby bound to adhere to the First Amendment); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925)
(stating in dicta that the "fundamental ... liberties" set forth in the First Amendment, including
the right to free speech, are protected from infringement by the states through the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
17. See Robert A. Sedler, An Essay on Freedom of Speech: The United States Versus the
Rest of the World, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REv. 377, 378 (2006) (discussing the characteristically
"broad and sweeping" language of the Bill of Rights, including the First Amendment, which
allows the Supreme Court to apply its own interpretations). Sedler's essay explores the
"unparalleled" expansiveness of First Amendment protections within the United States, resulting
from the case-by-case analysis used by courts when addressing free expression questions. Id. at
380. Many foreign nations, although built on democratic principles, do not extend the freedom of
speech as widely as the United States. Id. at 377 (citing the protection of "hate speech" as one
example). According to Sedler, many foreign audiences felt that "the Supreme Court has gone
'too far' in protecting freedom of speech against the government's efforts to prevent and sanction
'harmful' speech." Id.
18. Id. at 379 (recognizing the importance of the freedom of speech and noting that "other
democratic values must be advanced by means that do not abridge freedom of speech"). This
right may also be regarded as paramount because it provides for recognition and promotion of
other democratic principles.
19. See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 369, 400-01 (1969) (upholding
the constitutionality of the fairness doctrine as applied to broadcast radio stations by recognizing
the importance of the listener's right to exposure of opposing viewpoints); Sedler, supra note 17,
at 383 (analyzing the inherent balance achieved through the United States' protection of "hate
speech," and stating that "[u]nder the principle of content neutrality, the idea of inequality is
entitled to compete in the marketplace of ideas with the idea of equality").
20. See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931) ("The right [to freedom of
speech] is not an absolute one, and the State in the exercise of its police power may punish the
abuse of this freedom."). The First Amendment does not protect certain classes of speech, such
as speech that incites violence. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 363 (2003) (holding that a
state statute prohibiting cross-bumings as a means to intimidate others was constitutional, as
states are permitted to prohibit forms of expression "that are most likely to inspire fear of bodily
harm").
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21 22
expression involving fighting words, obscene materials, incitement of
imminent lawless action,23 true threats,24 and child pornography. And yet,
despite these exceptions, the Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the
First Amendment to provide expansive protection over a wide variety of
expressive conduct.
26
Although the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause refers explicitly only
to speech, courts have "lon recognized that its protection does not end at the
spoken or written word." 2w Nevertheless, courts have determined that such
protection is not limitless and does not extend to all forms of expressive
conduct. 28  Whether the conduct at issue is protected speech depends on
"whether '[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was present, and
[whether] the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by
those who viewed it.'
29
To determine whether a statute or regulation infringes upon protected
speech, courts must first determine whether the contested expression involves
21. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572-73 (1942) (finding that a New
Hampshire statute that prohibited "fighting words"-words that "by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace"--was constitutional).
22. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 486, 492 (1957) (holding that the protections of the
First Amendment do not extend to obscene material, or material "'which has relation to sexual
impurity and has a tendency to excite lustful thoughts' (internal citation omitted)).
23. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-49 (1969) (per curiam) (recognizing a
distinction between expression that merely advocates the use of force and expression used to
incite "imminent lawless action," and deeming regulations restricting the former violations of the
First Amendment).
24. See, e.g., Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707-08 (1969) (per curiam) (holding
that true threats-not merely verbal hyperbole-are not protected by the First Amendment).
25. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 749, 765 (1982) (finding that a New York statute
prohibiting the dissemination of material depicting children engaged in sexual conduct was
constitutional under the First Amendment).
26. See, e.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 155 (1959) (concluding that a state
ordinance prohibiting the possession of obscene material was overbroad and "inhibit[ed]
constitutionally protected expression"); see also Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369-70
(1931) (finding that a state ordinance prohibiting the display of a flag signifying opposition to
organized government violated the defendant's First Amendment right to freedom of expression);
Sedler, supra note 17, at 379 ("The Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment's
guarantee of freedom of speech very expansively, and the constitutional protection afforded to
freedom of speech is perhaps the strongest protection afforded to any individual right under the
Constitution.").
27. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989); see Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty.
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (finding that a student's display of a black armband in
school, worn in protest of the Vietnam War, was protected by the First Amendment).
28. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (recognizing that some conduct
contains speech and nonspeech elements, and denying protection to nonspeech conduct that is
void of expression).
29. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404 (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974)
(per curiam)).
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expressive conduct or speech alone.30 Next, if expressive conduct is involved,
courts must decide whether the regulation suppresses the right to free
expression.3 1 If the court concludes that the regulation does not suppress the
right to free expression, or involves only non-communicative conduct, then the
32regulation is evaluated under an intermediate standard of review.
If the regulation suppresses free expression, however, the court must
determine whether it is content-neutral or content-based.33 Content-neutral
regulations "are justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech.,34  A content-neutral regulation is one that, for instance, imposes
"reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions" on speech.35  If the court
deems the regulation to be content-neutral, it will apply an intermediate level
of scrutiny when evaluating its constitutionality.
36
30. See, e.g., id. at 403 (finding that the flag-burning conduct at issue required a
determination as to whether the conduct contained an expressive aspect). In Texas v. Johnson,
the Court ultimately concluded that "Johnson's burning of the flag was conduct 'sufficiently
imbued with elements of communication,' to implicate the First Amendment." Id. at 406
(quoting Spence, 418 U.S. at 409); see also W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
632, 634 (1943) (determining that an individual's refusal to salute the American flag is
communicative conduct protected by the First Amendment).
31. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 403.
32. Id. (citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377) (recognizing intermediate scrutiny as the
appropriate standard of review for regulations involving non-communicative conduct). Under
intermediate scrutiny,
a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power
of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
33. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986) (concluding
that a city ordinance restricting the location of adult theatres within a community was content-
neutral, as its impact on expression was secondary to the city's primary concern of the effects
which may result from the presence of an adult theatre within a community).
34. Va. State Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771
(1976).
35. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293-95 (1984) (holding that a
National Park Service regulation, though intended to prevent a demonstration by the Community
for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV), was constitutional because it restricted camping in the area
where CCNV wanted to conduct its overnight demonstration); see Va. State Pharmacy Bd, 425
U.S. at 771 (stating that courts have often recognized restrictions on expression as permissible so
long as they are "justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they serve
a significant governmental interest, and that in so doing they leave open ample alternative
channels for communication of the information").
36. Clark, 468 U.S. at 293. Under intermediate scrutiny, the regulation must be "narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and .. . leave open ample alternative
channels for communication of the information" to pass constitutional muster. Id.
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Conversely, a regulation is content-based if it is used primarily to suppress
unfavorable speech or expressive conduct. 37  Recognizing the paramount
importance of maintaining the free-flowing exchange of ideas, courts apply a
more stringent judicial test-strict scrutiny-when analyzing the
constitutionality of content-based regulations. 38 When evaluated under strict
scrutiny, a statute is constitutional if it is "necessary to serve a compelling state
interest and ... narrowly drawn to achieve that end.",
39
B. Expansive First Amendment Protection: Exploring Offensive Expression
and the First Amendment
Although courts have recognized that there are certain narrow classes of
expression that do not warrant First Amendment protection,40 courts have also
generally concluded that controversial and offensive expression, despite its
potential unpopularity, is protected by the First Amendment. 41 Although states
have the authority to use their police powers to "protect[] the social welfare of
all [their] citizens, 4 2 the importance of maintaining a marketplace of diverse-
and at times controversial-ideas may trump a state's exercise of this
authority.
43
37. See Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. at 48-49; see also Police Dep't of Chicago v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (striking down a Chicago ordinance that "describe[d] permissible
picketing in terms of its subject matter").
38. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)
(outlining the parameters of the strict judicial scrutiny standard that the government must abide
by when creating content-based regulations that are imposed in public forums).
39. Id.
40. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
41. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16, 20, 26 (1971) (holding that a jacket with
"F- the Draft" written on the back, though offensive in tone, did not fall within the category of
fighting words or obscenity, and thus was protected by the First Amendment); Org. for a Better
Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 418-20 (1971) (finding that a petitioner's invasion of privacy
claim based on the respondent's creation and peaceful public distribution of pamphlets negatively
portraying the petitioner was not valid because "peaceful pamphleteering is a form of
communication protected by the First Amendment"). Recognizing the right of individuals to
speak their minds freely regardless of the veracity of their statements, Justice Felix Frankfurter
wrote on behalf of the Court, "One of the prerogatives of American citizenship is the right to
criticize public men and measures-and that means not only informed and responsible criticism
but the freedom to speak foolishly and without moderation." Baumgartner v. United States, 322
U.S. 665, 673-74 (1944).
42. See State v. Sheldon, 629 A.2d 753, 763 (1993) (recognizing a valid state interest in the
goal of promoting religious, social, and racial tolerance).
43. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 117-1 (1991) ("We have long recognized that even regulations aimed at proper
governmental concerns can restrict unduly the exercise of rights protected by the First
Amendment." (quoting Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575, 592 (1983))); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 419 (1989) (finding unconstitutional a Texas
statute prohibiting the desecration of the American flag).
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For example, in Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Supreme Court established a legal
distinction between "advocacy of the use of force" and "advocacy... directed
to inciting or producing imminent lawless action [that] is likely to incite or
produce such action." 44 In Brandenburg, the Court examined the conviction of
a self-proclaimed Ku Klux Klan leader who was found guilty of violating an
Ohio statute that prohibited advocating the use of force or violence for political
reform, as well as assembling people and advocating "criminal syndicalism.
'" 45
The Court reversed the lower court ruling, determining that while the
defendant's speech contained dialogue that advocated the use of force, such
speech was protected by the First Amendment.46 According to the Court, there
is an important distinction between advocating the use of force and advocating
"imminent lawless action"; statutes prohibiting the former are unconstitutional
47prohibitions of free expression.
The Supreme Court extended First Amendment protection to cover offensive
speech once again in Cohen v. California.48 In Cohen, the defendant was
arrested for wearing a jacket with the words "F- the Draft" printed on the
back in a Los Angeles courthouse, in violation of a California statute
prohibiting offensive conduct that disturbed the peace. 49 The Supreme Court
found that the inscription was constitutionally protected, reasoning that "[n]o
individual actually or likely to be present could reasonably have regarded the
words on [the] jacket as a direct personal insult.' 5°  The Court ultimately
concluded that the defendant's freedom of expression, despite the expression's
44. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
45. Id. at 444-45. The defendant was charged with "'advocat[ing] ... the duty, necessity,
or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of
accomplishing industrial or political reform' and for 'voluntarily assembl(ing) with any society,
group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal
syndicalism."' Id. (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.13 (Anderson 1954) (current version
at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2917.01 (LexisNexis 2006))). The prosecution based its case on
televised films featuring the leader of the Kiu Klux Klan, as well as other hooded figures, that
wielded weapons, burned crosses, and made derogatory comments against the Jewish and African
American populations. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 445-46.
46. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447-49 (finding that the Ohio statute lacked the necessary
refinement and was therefore unconstitutional).
47. Id. at 448-49; see Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 134 (1966) (determining that a
defendant's statements supporting an individual's decision to bum his draft card in opposition to
the Vietnam War was not an "incitement to violation of law" and was protected by the First
Amendment).
48. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
49. Id. at 16. The statute provided that "'[e]very person who maliciously and willfully
disturbs the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person ... by tumultuous or offensive conduct
... or use[s] any vulgar, profane, or indecent language within the presence or hearing of women
or children . . .is guilty of a misdemeanor." Id. at 16 n.1 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 415
(West 1970), repealedby Act of Sept. 23, 1974, ch. 1263, 1974 CAL. STAT. 2742).
50. Id at 20.
1207
Catholic University Law Review
offensive tone, outweighed the state's interest in regulating speech in order to
keep the peace.
51
1. Treatment of Expressions of Violence and Hate by Courts
Justice William J. Brennan Jr. emphasized the power of the First
Amendment in Texas v. Johnson, stating, "If there is a bedrock principle of the
First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of
an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable." But does this protection also extend to conduct that expresses
hate and violence? When addressing such controversial expression, courts are
forced to balance their interests in protecting a society from threats and
harassment with those of upholding the right to free speech.53
In Collin v. Smith, the Seventh Circuit addressed whether the First
Amendment protected offensive expression directed at Jews. 54  In Collin, a
political group called the National Socialist Party of America (NSPA)
requested a permit to march and distribute brochures containing anti-Jewish
messages through the streets of Skokie, Illinois, a town with a large Jewish
population.55 The town denied the permit, determining that the planned march
violated a city ordinance declaring that gatherings "will not portray criminality,
depravity or lack of virtue in, or incite violence, hatred, abuse or hostility
toward a person or group of persons by reason of reference to religious, racial,
ethnic, national or regional affiliation. City officials also concluded that the
gathering would violate ordinances prohibiting both the dissemination of
51. Id. at 26 ("[O]ne of the prerogatives of American citizenship is the right to criticize
public men and measures-and that means not only informed and responsible criticism but the
freedom to speak foolishly and without moderation." (quoting Baumgartner v. United States, 322
U.S. 665, 673-74 (1944))). The Court also determined that the words "F- the Draft" did not fall
within the category of obscene speech because they did not evoke a sense of eroticism. Id. at 19-
20. Moreover, the inscription did not constitute "fighting words" because the message was not
directed at a single recipient. Id. at 20.
52. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
53. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1992) (recognizing that there are
certain narrow categories of speech that are not protected by the First Amendment because the
social value of prohibiting the speech outweighs upholding the right to that particular form of
expression); People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 603, 615 (Cal. 1997) (recognizing the
state's obligation to "'maintain a decent society"' in upholding as constitutional an injunction
prohibiting gang members from appearing with one another in the public (quoting Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting))).
54. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1199-200 (7th Cir. 1978).
55. Id. The National Socialist Party of America (NSPA) identified itself as a Nazi-affiliated
party whose members directed hateful and prejudicial comments at Jews and African Americans.
Id. at 1199.
56. Id. (internal citation omitted).
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materials that may incite violence and the disvlay of military-style uniforms
during political group gatherings held in public.
The Seventh Circuit determined that the NSPA's material was protected-
despite its offensive nature-because First Amendment protection extends to
wide-ranging ideas regardless of the validity or veracity of the expression.
58
The court emphasized the importance of maintaining the right to free speech as
a means of fostering civil liberties, despite the potentially hostile or ignorant
59content of the message.
Protection of hate speech was also examined in State v. Sheldon, where the
Court of APeals of Maryland analyzed whether burning a cross is protected
expression. In Sheldon, the defendants were separately indicted under a
Maryland statute that banned cross-burning. 6' In response, the defendants
challenged the constitutionality of the statute, claiming that it violated their
First Amendment right to free speech.62
The Sheldon court first determined that burning religious symbols, though
unspoken conduct, was expressive conduct constituting speech. According to
57. Id. at 1199-200 (internal citation omitted). During its public marches, the NSPA wore
military-style uniforms similar to those worn by the German Nazi Party, including the display of
a swastika. Id. at 1199.
58. See id at 1203 ("'Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea.
However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of
judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas."' (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974))).
59. Id. at 1210 ("[1]f these civil rights are to remain vital for all, they must protect not only
those society deems acceptable, but also those whose ideas it quite justifiably rejects and
despises.").
60. State v. Sheldon, 629 A.2d 753, 755-56 (Md. 1993).
61. Id. at 755. One defendant burned a cross on the property of an African American
family, and the other burned a cross on public property. Id. at 755-56. The Maryland statute
under which the defendants were indicted read
It shall be unlawful for any person or persons to burn or cause to be burned any
cross or other religious symbol upon any private or public property within this State
without the express consent of the owner of such property and without first giving
notice to the fire department which services the area in which such burning is to take
place. Any person or persons who violates the provisions of this section shall, upon
conviction, be deemed guilty of a felony and shall suffer punishment for a period not to
exceed 3 years or shall be fined an amount not to exceed $5,000 or shall suffer both
such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court.
Id. (quoting MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 10A (LexisNexis 1992), repealed by Act of May 26,
1994, ch. 555, 1994 Md. Laws 2617-19).
62. Id. at 756. The defendants challenged the constitutionality of the state ordinance
prohibiting the burning of crosses on five grounds: (1) facially, the statute violated freedom of
speech; (2) "as applied," the statute violated freedom of speech; (3) the statute violated the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause; (4) the statute was "unconstitutionally vague"; and (5) the
statute was "unconstitutionally overbroad." Id.
63. Id. at 756-57 (concluding that burning religious symbols is expressive speech because
people who burn the symbols are aware of the message the act conveys to potential viewers); see
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (holding that a St. Paul ordinance prohibiting
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the court, burning religious symbols like crosses can be expressive conduct
because the goal of the conduct is to "'conve a particularized message' to be
received by those who view the conduct. When examining whether the
Maryland statute was content-based or content-neutral, the court determined
that it was content-based because it was directed at limiting the message
conveyed by burning religious symbols. 65 Because the statute was content-
based, it was subject to strict scrutiny review.66  Ultimately, the court
concluded that despite its goal of promoting social tolerance, the statute
unnecessarily violated the right to free speech and could not survive strict
scrutiny.
67
2. How Courts Have Addressed the Issue of Gang Expression Under the
First Amendment
Gang-related expression poses constitutional questions similar to those faced
by courts in other expressive conduct cases involving hate or violence.
Namely, courts must weigh the possibility of harassment and violence against
the right to express oneself freely. 68  Criminal gangs, while not a new.... 69
phenomenon, have become pervasive in many communities. In response to
the growing violence and criminal conduct associated with criminal gangs,
some courts have imposed gang injunctions to combat their activity.70
the burning of religious symbols was unconstitutional because the First Amendment does not
permit states to suppress only speech conveying "disfavored" or controversial viewpoints).
64. Sheldon, 629 A.2d at 756 (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974)
(per curiam)).
65. Id. at 758-59.
66. Id. at 759.
67. Id. at 762-63. ("Maryland's cross burning law simply cannot be deemed 'necessary' to
the State's effort to foster racial and religious accord.").
68. Cf People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 609 (Cal. 1997) ("Freedom of
association, in the sense protected by the First Amendment, 'does not extend to joining with
others for the purpose of depriving third parties of their lawful rights."' (quoting Madsen v.
Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 776 (1994))).
69. See EGLEY, JR. & MAJOR, supra note 5 (stating that "[a]ll cities with a population of
250,000 or more reported gang activity in 2001"). Many gangs identify themselves in a
community by wearing particular insignia, such as tattoos, numbers, colors, and symbols. See
L.A. Police Dep't, How Are Gangs Identified, http://www.lapdonline.org/getinformed
/content basic view/23468 (last visited July 28, 2010) (highlighting common symbols, clothing,
and jewelry used by gang members to identify themselves). For example, members of the
criminal gang known as the Crips usually wear the colors black and blue, alone or in conjunction,
while members of the rival gang the Bloods wear red. Id.
70. See, e.g., Gallo, 929 P.2d at 608 (reversing the lower court's opinion and enjoining the
associational freedoms of known gang members by prohibiting them from appearing with other
known gang members in public view); People v. Englebrecht, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 738, 741-42, 760
(Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (affirming an injunction of the defendants, who were all members of an
identified criminal gang, from engaging in gang-related activities such as affiliating with other
gang members and displaying gang insignia within a certain geographical area); see also Myers,
supra note 9, at 289 ("Between 1993 and 2000, at least 30 gang injunctions were issued in
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Although states have the authority to regulate and prevent criminal conduct
under their police powers, gang injunctions may pose a threat to an
individual's First Amendment rights.
71
In City of Harvard v. Gaut, the Appellate Court of Illinois addressed the
constitutionality of a city ordinance that prohibited gang-related
communications within the city limits. 72 The ordinance deemed it unlawful for
"'any person within the City to wear known gang colors, emblems, or other
insignia, or appear to be engaged in communicating gang-related messages
through the use of hand signals or other means of communication.' 73 In Gaut,
a thirteen-year-old boy was arrested for violating the ordinance after police
officers noticed him in public wearing a six-pointed star associated with the
gang "Action Packed Gangster Disciples."74 In response, the defendant argued
that the ordinance was unconstitutionally overbroad.75
The court agreed with the defendant that the ordinance was overbroad and
determined that while it prohibited potentially harmful gang communication, it
also stifled symbolic speech protected by the First Amendment.76 The court
noted that the ordinance could unfairly punish those who knowingly wear
gang-associated clothing for reasons entirely unrelated to gang activity, such as
to display religious or school affiliation.7 7 Despite its valid intention to combat
organized crime, the ordinance could not stand because it was
78unconstitutionally overbroad.
Similarly, in Gatto v. County of Sonoma, the California Court of Appeals
ruled that a Sonoma County fair's dress code, which prohibited "apparel or
accessories intended to provoke, offend or intimidate others . . . including
offensive slogans, insignia or 'gang colors,"' was unconstitutional. In Gatto,
Southern California, and they are still used against criminal street gangs throughout the United
States as a way to combat violent gang activity.").
7 1. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
72. City of Harvard v. Gaut, 660 N.E.2d 259, 260 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
73. Id. (quoting HARVARD, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 26.04 (1993) (repealed 1994)
(emphasis omitted)).
74. Id. at 260.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 262. According to the court, a law that suffers from an overly broad application
can be identified if it "criminalizes a substantial amount of protected behavior, when judged in
relation to the law's 'plainly legitimate sweep' . . . and is not susceptible to a limiting
construction that avoids constitutional problems." Id. (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S.
601, 615 (1973)).
77. Id. at 263. During the defendant's hearing, the arresting officers testified that many of
the symbols, colors, and insignia commonly associated with a particular criminal gang are not
necessarily worn to display gang identity. For example, the colors black and gold are associated
with both the criminal gang the Latin Kings and a local high school. Id. at 261.
78. Id. at 264.
79. Gatto v. County of Sonoma, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550, 553-54 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
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the plaintiff was ejected from the county fair for wearing a vest bearing the
Hell's Angels Motorcycle Club insignia on the back.
80
Acknowledging that ordinances regulating the dress of persons in public are
troublesome, 8 the court rejected the county fair policy as unconstitutionality
overbroad and vague. 82  Not only did the regulation fail to specify the
definition of "gang colors" ade3uately, leaving citizens unsure of the
regulation's subjective application, it was also overly broad, as citizens with
no gang affiliations could inadvertently choose to wear clothing that could be
interpreted as gang-related.84 Thus, the Gatto court upheld the importance of
free expression by emphasizing the limitations on the government's ability to
suppress the expression of an isolated group, regardless of whether others
could be intimidated by the content of the group's message.
8 5
C. The First Amendment Knows No Boundaries: Constitutional Protections
for Internet Speech
As the Internet continues to grow, legislators face a glaring question: should
a new form of regulation, specifically designed to accommodate the rapidly
expanding characteristics of the Internet, be created, or can the Internet itself
conform to existing law?86  Nothing highlights this dilemma more than
80. Id.
81. Id. at 571-72 (noting that dress codes imposed in restricted arenas, like schools, are
usually upheld, whereas those imposed on public patrons are more difficult to uphold as
constitutional); Hodge v. S.T. Lynd, 88 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1243 (D. N.M. 2000) (stating that
whether regulations imposing dress codes can survive judicial scrutiny depends on the area in
which the dress codes are being enforced, and recognizing that those enforced in public forums
are the most difficult to uphold).
82. Gatto, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 573-76.
83. Id. at 573-74 (observing that the regulation's imprecise language is "so highly
subjective as to provide enforcement authorities almost unfettered license to decide what the dress
code permits and prohibits"); see Stephenson v. Davenport Cmty. Sch. Dist., 110 F.3d 1303, 1310
(8th Cir. 1997) (holding unconstitutional a school's regulation prohibiting gang symbols and
colors because the terms were too vague to provide students with notice as to what constituted
prohibited conduct).
84. See Gatto, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 573-75; see also Hodge, 88 F. Supp. 2d at 1243 (finding
that a fair's dress code that prohibited wearing baseball caps backwards was overbroad because
there could be cases when youths wear clothing, such as backwards baseball caps, that could be
perceived as gang-related though they are not members of gangs).
85. Gatto, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 574-75. According to the court, the language of the dress
code could be specifically tailored to pass judicial scrutiny; for example, the code could prohibit
only clothing bearing Hell's Angels insignia if it is commonly known that such insignia would
incite violence or criminal behavior if worn within a particular public forum. Id. at 576.
86. See Yuval Karniel & Haim Wismonsky, Pornography, Community, and the Internet-
Freedom of Speech and Obscenity on the Internet, 30 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 105,
105 (2004). There are two major approaches to Internet law:
According to the former "revolutionary" approach, Internet law is a separate,
autonomous field with its own developing independent codes and unique guiding
principles which cannot be addressed by traditional legal doctrine....
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obscenity on the Internet.8 7  Faced with a need to protect both community
standards and the right to freedom of expression, courts walk a tightrope when
determining the constitutionality of regulations that touch the Internet.
In 1997, the issue of freedom of expression on the Internet reached the
Supreme Court. In Reno v. ACLU, the Court addressed whether certain
provisions of the Communications Decency Act (CDA)-an act aimed at
protecting minors from exposure to harmful material on the Internet-violated
the freedom of expression.89 Specifically, the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) challenged the constitutionality of 47 U.S.C. §§ 223(a) and 223(d),
which prohibited "the knowing transmission of obscene or indecent messages
to any recipient under the age of 18"90 and "the knowing sending or displaying
of patently offensive messages in a manner that is available to a person under
18 years of age."
9 1
In Reno, the Court recognized the Intemet's incredibly expansive means of
communication, accessibility, and usability, 92  and acknowledged the
importance of maintaining the "free exchange" of ideas within this newly
evolving marketplace. 93  With these considerations in mind, the Court
addressed the CDA's regulation of indecent versus obscene material on the
Internet.9 4
Under the second "moderate" approach, cyberlaw does not have the capability to
occupy its own "space." . . . The moderate approach views the Internet as a novel
medium that traditional law can address by means of existing tools.
Id. at 105-06. In their article, Karniel and Wismonsky address the "revolutionary" versus
"moderate" debate by examining how courts have addressed the "dissemination of obscen [ity]"
on the Internet. Id. at 107.
87. Id. at 106-07.
88. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997).
89. Id. at 844.
90. Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (1994 & Supp. 11 1997)).
91. Id. at 859 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 223(d)).
92. Id. at 850-51 (stating that "[a]nyone with access to the Internet may take advantage of a
wide variety of communication and information retrieval methods," including chat rooms, email,
and news groups).
93. Id. at 885 ("As a matter of constitutional tradition, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, we presume that governmental regulation of the content of speech is more likely to
interfere with the free exchange of ideas than to encourage it.").
94. Id. at 864. In Miller v. California, the Supreme Court set forth a test to determine
whether speech is obscene when it examined the distribution of sexually explicit materials,
including images and drawings of sexual intercourse to unwilling recipients. Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15, 18 (1973). The Court recognized the importance and validity of a state's ability to
exercise its police powers by regulating the distribution of obscene materials. Id. at 18-20.
According to the Court, obscene material consists of "works which, taken as a whole, appeal to
the prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which,
taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Id. at 24.
The Court also recognized that the standard used to determine obscenity must reflect the values of
different communities. Id at 32-34 ("It is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the
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The Court compared the scope of the CDA provisions with previous
obscenity cases 95 and determined that the provisions were both overbroad and
vague.96  The CDA suffered from, among other things, a lack of clarity
regarding the definition of "indecent," as well as its application to individuals
less than eighteen years of age, resulting in the inclusion of those who are close
to the age of majority. 97 Moreover, the Court noted a troubling inconsistency.... 98
in the language used between the two provisions in question. The Court
concluded that the provisions were unconstitutional because of the possibility
that the provisions would prohibit speech not considered obscene.99 In Reno,
the Court also raised the question, albeit in dicta, of whether the definition of
Internet obscenity should change based on varying community standards.
100
Perhaps most importantly, by finding these provisions of the CDA
First Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi accept public depiction of
conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas, or New York City.").
95. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 864-66 (1997). For instance, the Court compared the
parameters of the CDA with those of a New York statute prohibiting the sale of obscene materials
to persons under the age of seventeen. Id. at 864-65. Unlike the CDA, the New York statute was
found to be constitutional because it did not bar parents from buying obscene material for their
children; it applied only to commercial transactions, included a more narrow definition of
"harmful material," and applied to children under the age of seventeen, rather than eighteen. Id.
at 865-66 (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639, 646-47 (1968)).
96. Id. at 864-66, 868.
97. Id. at 865-66.
98. Id. at 870-71. The Court pointed out that while § 223(a) uses the language
"communication which is obscene[, lewd, lascivious, filthy,] or indecent," § 223(d) refers to
"communication that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards." Id. at 859-60, 870-71 (quoting 47 U.S.C. §§ 223(a), 223(d)
(1994 & Supp. 11 1997)).
99. Id. at 874-75 (reaffirming the First Amendment's protection of indecent material by
ruling certain provisions of the CDA unconstitutional). In Sable Communications v. FCC, the
Court also distinguished indecent material from obscene material when it decided a case
challenging the constitutionality of section 223(b) of the Communications Act of 1934, which
instituted a blanket ban on both indecent and obscene interstate telephone messages. Sable
Commc'ns v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 117 (1989). In Sable, the Court ruled that prohibiting obscene
telephone messages was a constitutional means to prevent access of such materials to minors, and
that interstate communications must adhere to the community-standard definition of obscenity.
Id. at 125-26. However, as written, the Act was unconstitutionally overbroad in its prohibition of
both obscene and indecent messages. Id. at 131.
100. Reno, 521 U.S. at 877-78. Although the majority refused to rule on the constitutionality
of the community-contingent standard as applied to the Intemet, the Court acknowledged the
community-standard approach in dicta: "[T]he 'community standards' criterion as applied to the
Internet means that any communication available to a nation-wide audience will be judged by the
standards of the community most likely to be offended by the message." Id. In other words,
according to Justice Stevens, Internet speech would be judged by a lowest denominator standard,
wherein the most sensitive community would set the standard as to whether the material is
considered obscene.
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unconstitutional, the Court extended First Amendment protection to expression
transmitted via the Internet.
10 1
Five years later, the Court directly addressed this community-contingent
standard in Ashcroft v. ACLU.102  Similar to Reno, a group of petitioners
challenged the Child Online Protection Act (COPA), questioning the
constitutionality of COPA's community-contingent approach.10 3  Although
narrower in scope than the CDA, COPA was also enacted to prevent the
transmission of "harmful material" made for commercial purposes to children
via the Internet.1
0 4
Comparing COPA to the previously repealed provisions of the CDA, the
Court explained that COPA improved on the ambiguities of the CDA by
limiting the restrictions to commercial communications displayed on the
Internet that consisted of "'material that is harmful to minors." ' 10 5 The Court
found that the technological limitations of the Internet-which do not allow
website operators to restrict transmitted content to a specific geographic
region--did not warrant abandonment of the community-contingent
101. See id. at 885 ("[T]he growth of the Internet has been and continues to be phenomenal
.... The interest in encouraging freedom of expression in a democratic society outweighs any
theoretical but unproven benefit of censorship.").
102. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 566 (2002). The growing popularity and use of the
Internet also poses an interesting challenge to the conception of what is considered a
"community." See Karniel & Wismonsky, supra note 86, at 124. Kamiel and Wismonsky
questioned whether "the Internet form[s] a new 'community' or 'communities."' Id. They
submitted three possible answers: (1) the Internet allows for "the creation of many virtual
communities"; (2) "the Internet creates one virtual community comprised of all Intemet users";
and (3) "the Internet has not created any new type of community." Id. at 124-25.
103. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 571-72.
104. Id. at 569-70. The relevant language of the Act reads:
Whoever knowingly and with knowledge of the character of the material, in
interstate or foreign commerce by means of the World Wide Web, makes any
communication for commercial purposes that is available to any minor and that
includes any material that is harmful to minors shall be fined not more than $50,000,
imprisoned not more than 6 months, or both.
47 U.S.C. § 23 1(a)(l) (2006).
105. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 569-70 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1)). Responding to the
ambiguity of the CDA, Congress defined "material harmful to minors" as
any communication, picture, image, graphic image file, article, recording, writing, or
other matter of any kind that is obscene or that-
(A) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find,
taking the material as a whole and with respect to minors, is designed to appeal to, or is
designed to pander to, the prurient interest;
(B) depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently offensive with respect to
minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact, an actual or simulated
normal or perverted sexual act, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals or post-pubescent
female breast; and
(C) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for
minors.
47 U.S.C. § 23 1(e)(6).
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standard.10 6 Rather, the Court concluded that website operators must bear the
burden of complying with the community standards of every individual who
accesses their websites, even those in the most conservative communities.'
0 7
Thus, the Court ruled that the community standard approach used to define
"material that is harmful to minors" within COPA was not unconstitutionally
overbroad under the First Amendment.
10 8
II. A CLOSER LOOK AT THE SCOPE OF FLORIDA STATUTES SECTION 874.11
The presence of criminal gangs has become an alarming problem in Florida;
the state contains over 1000 known gangs and 65,000 known gang members.
10 9
In response to the growing problem of criminal gang activity, Florida
legislators passed section 874.11 of the Florida Statutes as part of the Criminal
Gang Prevention Act, a 2008 law addressing gang-related crimes and the
resulting punishments. 110 The law prohibits the transmission of gang-related
media over electronic communications for the purposes of intimidation or
harassment."1'1 Section 874.11 states:
Any person who, for the purpose of benefiting, promoting, or
furthering the interests of a criminal gang, uses electronic
communication to intimidate or harass other persons, or to advertise
his or her presence in the community, including, but not limited to,
such activities as distributing, selling, transmitting, or posting on the
Internet any audio, video, or still image of criminal activity, commits
a felony of the third degree .... 112
106. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 583.
107. See id
108. Id. at 585. In his dissent, Justice Stevens challenged the majority's determination that
the community-contingent approach as applied to the Internet is constitutional, arguing that "[i]f a
prurient appeal is offensive in a puritan village, it may be a crime to post it on the World Wide
Web." Id. at 603 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He explained that the majority should have
determined the constitutionality of COPA as it did the CDA because both Acts suffer from an
"overbreadth problem." Id. at 606.
109. Natalie Neysa Alund, Fla. AG Unveils Anti-Gang Plan, BRADENTON HERALD, Apr. 3,
2008, http://www.policeone.com/gangs/articles/1680255-Fla-AG-unveils-anti-gang-plan/; see
OFFICE OF STATEWIDE PROSECUTION, REPORT OF THE STATEWIDE GRAND JURY, GANGS AND
GANG-RELATED ACTIVITY; RECOMMENDATIONS TO ASSIST LAW ENFORCEMENT 1 (1992)
http://myfloridalegal.com/osp (follow "List of Statewide Grand Jury Reports" hyperlink; then
follow "Gangs & Gang-Related Activity; Recommendations to Assist Law Enforcement"
hyperlink) (finding that the presence of gangs within the state of Florida is a major factor
contributing to the large increase of crime in the state).
110. Criminal Gang Prevention Act, ch. 2008-338, 2008 Fla. Laws 2755-62 (codified at FLA.
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While other states, such as California and Texas, have enacted legislation in
response to the problems of criminal gangs, 113 Florida's law goes one step
further by imposing gang-related restrictions on content transmitted over the
Internet. 114
Despite its recent enactment, there have been several prosecutions under the
Florida statute, with fifteen arrests made within six weeks of the new law's
enactment. 115 The fifteen people arrested were between fourteen and fifty-
eight years old, and one arrest was the result of a fourteen-year-old posting
images of himself "dressed in gang colors and displaying gang hand signals"
on a social networking website. 
6
Three defendants who were among those first arrested under the new law
faced up to five years in prison."17 The defendants, Richard Omar Figueroa-
Santiago, Elvis Eladio Rodriguez, and Obduella David Soto, were arrested in
November 2008,118 and were taken into custody as a result of posting images
on their personal MySpace pages in which they were pictured wearing gang
colors and giving hand signals associated with the criminal gang the Latin
Kings. 119 The men challenged the constitutionality of the statute in the Lee
County Circuit Court, asserting, among other constitutional claims, that its
current application is vague and overbroad.1
20
On January 8, 2010, Circuit Judge Romiro Manalich denied the defendants'
motion to dismiss, rejecting their allegation that the statute is an
unconstitutional violation of First Amendment rights. 121 While the court did
recognize Florida Statutes section 874.11 to be a content-based regulation, it
nonetheless determined that it could survive strict scrutiny review.
1 22
According to the court, the Florida legislature's goal of preventing criminal
gang proliferation and ensuring public safety satisfies the compelling
113. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 13826 (West 2009) (enacting gang-prevention legislation in
response to the growing problem of criminal gang proliferation in California, resulting in
increased levels of drug activity and violence amongst the youth); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 61.10 (Vernon 2006) (appointing the Texas Violent Gang Task Force as a means to efficiently
track the growth and activities of criminal gangs within the state of Texas).
114. See§874.11.
115. Eric P. Robinson, Florida Sees Gangs in Social Networks, and Prosecutes, CITIZEN
MEDIA LAW PROJECT, Aug. 6, 2009, http://www.citmedialaw.orgiblog/2009/florida-sees-gangs-
social-networks-and-prosecutes.
116. Id.
117. Beardsley, supra note 14.
118. Figueroa-Santiago Case Detail, supra note 14; Rodriguez Case Detail, supra note 14;
Soto Case Detail, supra note 14.
119. State v. Figueroa-Santiago, No. 08-CF-021458, slip op. at 5-6 (Fla. Lee County Ct. Jan.
8, 2010), available at http://media.naplesnews.com/media/static/gang.pdf (order denying motion
to dismiss); Beardsley, supra note 14.
120. Figueroa-Santiago, No. 08-CF-021458, slip op. at 11-14; Beardsley, supra note 14.
121. Figueroa-Santiago, No 08-CF-021458, slip op. at 16-17.
122. Id. at 13-14.
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governmental interest prong of the strict scrutiny standard. 123  Second, the
court determined that the statute is narrowly tailored because it includes
language limiting its application only to those individuals
who use electronic communication to intimidate or harass combined
with the purpose and specific intent of furthering, promoting, or
benefiting the interest of a criminal gang; or those gang members or
associates who advertise their presence in the community through
electronic communication and do so with the specific intent of
benefiting, promoting, or furthering the interest of a criminal gang.
24
Although the strict scrutiny standard is high, the court concluded that this
limiting construction adequately tailored the statute's reach to avoid
unconstitutional interference with an individual's First Amendment rights.'
25
111. THE RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH SHOULD PROTECT GANG EXPRESSION:
FLORIDA STATUTES SECTION 874.11 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Although states are permitted to regulate criminal activity under their police
powers, they must also keep in mind that "[t]he interest in encouraging
freedom of expression in a democratic society outweighs any theoretical but
unproven benefit of censorship."' 2 6 Regardless of the policy considerations
behind the enactment of the Florida law, its broad and vague prohibition of any
images relating to the promotion of gangs is inconsistent with First
Amendment jurisprudence.
127
A. Section 8 74.11 Cannot Survive Strict Scrutiny Review
Because of the importance of maintaining free expression within the
marketplace of ideas, the government cannot arbitrarily impose restrictions on
expression, regardless of whether such expression is controversial or hostile.,
28
Courts must adhere to high standards when evaluating content-based
regulations because regulations restricting expression must survive strict
123. Id. at 13.
124. Id. at 14.
125. Id. In denying the motion to dismiss, the court also addressed the defendants' claim that
the statute was unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 11. According to the court, unlike an overbreadth
challenge, a claim alleging statutory vagueness cannot stand on hypothetical assertions. Id.
(citing State v. Brake, 796 So. 2d 522, 527 (Fla. 2001)). The court determined that the conduct of
the three defendants clearly fell within the prohibitory scope of section 874.11, and thus the claim
did not warrant further review. Id.
126. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997).
127. See, e.g., City of Harvard v. Gaut, 660 N.E.2d 259, 264 (1I. App. Ct. 1996) (holding
that an ordinance prohibiting the display of gang-related insignia was unconstitutionally
overbroad because it also applied to a wide variety of protected expression).
128. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (holding that a city
ordinance prohibiting the use of fighting words was unconstitutional because the purpose of the
ordinance was to suppress "disfavored" viewpoints).
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scrutiny to be constitutionally valid. 129 Under strict scrutiny, a content-based
regulation must be "necessary to serve a compelling state interest and ...
narrowly drawn to achieve that end" in order to survive constitutional
examination. 13  Thus, when examining a contested regulation, an important
step for the court is to determine whether the regulation is enforced solely as a
means to suppress a targeted viewpoint.'
31
Section 874.11, as currently written, is a content-based restriction because it
prohibits expression based solely on the fact that it promotes gang affiliation, a
viewpoint that is clearly disfavored by the Florida government. Because
such content-based regulations "presumptively violate the First
Amendment,"' 133 the Florida law must be analyzed using strict scrutiny.
134
Despite Lee County Circuit Judge Manalich's ruling to the contrary,135
section 874.11 cannot survive strict scrutiny. Although crime prevention and
ensuring public safety are valid state interests, the government cannot
arbitrarily suppress expression to achieve its crime-fighting purposes.136
Similar to Sheldon, where the Maryland Court of Appeals struck down a
statute prohibiting cross burning that was enacted to promote tolerance and
protect citizen welfare, 137 section 874.11 unduly burdens First Amendment
rights. In addition to suppressing protected expression, the statute may prove
ineffective because those who wish to associate with gangs may not be
deterred by the regulation.13 8 Although crime prevention is a valid government
interest, encroaching on the freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment is
justified only when the encroachment is necessary to prevent the crime.
139
Similar to acts of hatred, like Ku Klux Klan marches and cross burnings,
Intemet gang promotion involves expression that carries with it the possibility
129. See id. at 382 ("Content-based regulations are presumptively invalid.").
130. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (citing
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)).
131. See, e.g., State v. Sheldon, 629 A.2d 753, 758-59 (Md. 1993) (determining whether a
cross-burning statute was a content-based regulation).
132. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 874.11 (West 2009) (criminalizing the use of electronic
communication "for the purpose of benefiting, promoting, or furthering the interests of a criminal
gang"); cf City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48-49 (1986) (stating that a
government may not impose a regulation which favors the viewpoints of one group while
suppressing the viewpoints of others).
133. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. at 46-47.
134. See, e.g., Sheldon, 629 A.2d at 758-59 (stating that content-based regulations must be
analyzed using the "demanding" strict scrutiny).
135. See supra text accompanying notes 121-25.
136. See Sheldon, 629 A.2d at 763 (rejecting the argument that Maryland's cross-burning
statute was necessary to promote tolerance of diversity).
137. Id.
138. Cf Myers, supra note 9 (discussing the ineffectiveness of a court-imposed gang
injunction where a community's crime rate more than tripled after the imposition of the
injunction).
139. See, e.g., Sheldon, 629 A.2d at 763.
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of responsive crime and violence. Although gang members may endorse
criminality and hatred toward opposing groups-sometimes reflected in
wearing certain bandana colors and displaying certain gang symbols-courts
have emphasized that the law cannot forcibly impose tolerance of others.1
40
Because viewpoint discrimination is unconstitutional when applied to hate
speech,141 and because materials that promote gangs are similar to hate speech
in their message of intolerance and intimidation, the Florida statute prohibiting
Internet gang promotion should be regarded as equally unconstitutional. Thus,
Florida Statutes section 874.11 does not fulfill the compelling interest prong of
the strict scrutiny standard.
1 42
Section 874.11 cannot satisfy the narrowly tailored prong of the strict
scrutiny standard because it is vague and overly broad. First, the statute's
language includes vague terminology, as it fails to provide specific definitions
for "criminal gang," "intimidate," or "advertise."'' 43 As the Appellate Court of
Illinois concluded in City of Harvard v. Gaut, without specificity in
terminology, the statute is left to the subjective interpretation of government
officials, prosecutors, and law enforcement officers, providing for seemingly
limitless interpretations of what constitutes promotion 
of a criminal gang.
Moreover, such ambiguity cannot muster constitutional support because it does
not provide citizens with appropriate notice as to what constitutes a criminal
gang. 145  Finally, it is unclear if the statute applies to individuals who
sympathize with or endorse the activities of a gang but are not actually in the
gang itself.
146
Second, despite Circuit Judge Manalich's limiting construction argument,
147
the statute is overly broad. As currently written, it prohibits individuals from
using electronic communication "for the purpose of benefiting, promoting, or
furthering the interests of a criminal gang ... to intimidate or harass ... or to
,,148
advertise his or her presence. However, much of the prohibited activity-
like personally displaying colors, tattoos, and making hand gestures-falls
140. See id. at 763 ("Official encroachment upon the expression of developed beliefs is no
necessary part of civil consonance, because tolerance is an acquired taste.").
141. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992) (declaring unconstitutional an
ordinance that engaged in viewpoint discrimination).
142. See supra notes 135-41 and accompanying text. But see State v. Figueroa-Santiago,
No. 08-CF-021458, slip op. at 13 (Fla. Lee County Ct. Jan. 8, 2010), available at http://media.
naplesnews.com/media.static.gang.pdf (order denying motion to dismiss).
143. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 874.11 (West 2009).
144. See City of Harvard v. Gaut, 660 N.E.2d 259, 263 (II1. App. Ct. 1996); see also
Stephenson v. Davenport Cmty. Sch. Dist., 110 F.3d 1302, 1310 (8th Cir. 1997) (recognizing the
problem of subjective interpretation as to what constitutes a gang and the need for gang
definitions within regulations).
145. Stephenson, I 10 F.3d at 1310.
146. See § 874.11.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 124-125.
148. § 874.11.
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within the scope of symbolic expression protected by the Constitution. 49 As
the Gaut court indicated, the right to choose one's personal dress is generally
considered to be protected by the First Amendment.150  Courts will give
deference to the symbolic speech rights of those who wish to display certain
colors or clothing, even if the group wearing the attire has a history of illegal
or immoral behavior.15' Because the Florida statute prohibits protected
personal expression, it unjustifiably encroaches upon the free speech rights of
those who wish to display particular colors, emblems, or insignia.
B. Gang Promotion on the Internet: No Different than Electronically
Transmitting Indecent Material
Because it focuses solely on regulating the transmission of gang promotion
via the Internet, Florida Statutes section 874.11 is unlike gang-related
legislation in other states.152 Under the First Amendment, indecent material
and gang promotion material are similar: gang-related expression, like some
indecent material, is offensive and threatening.f 53 As established by the Court
in Reno v. ACLU, however, Internet expression, which may at times convey• • 154
indecent messages, is protected speech. The Court in Reno clarified that a
regulation that is vague and overly broad cannot withstand constitutional
scrutiny regardless of a state's objectives in protecting social welfare. 55 Thus,
despite the expansive reach of the Internet, courts must recognize the rights of
individuals to free expression, regardless of the subjectively offensive or
threatening content.' 56 Because the Florida statute prohibiting gang promotion
on electronic communication shares a similar deficiency with the portions of
the CDA struck down in Reno, its prohibition is inconsistent with established
149. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (finding
that a student's display of a black armband signifying opposition to the Vietnam War on school
grounds was expressive speech and could not be prohibited).
150. City of Harvard v. Gaut, 660 N.E.2d 259, 262-63 (11. App. Ct. 1996).
151. Seeidat263.
152. Compare § 874.11, with CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 13826.15-13826.65 (2009) (focusing on
enhanced efforts by prosecutors, counties, community organizations and schools to combat gang
activity), and TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 61.10 (Vernon 2006) (articulating that the Texas
Violent Gang Task Force shall focus on various efforts, such as communication between state
agencies, to combat gang activity).
153. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997) (concluding that indecent material
transmitted over the Internet, despite its offensive content, is still protected by the First
Amendment); Gatto v. County of Sonoma, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550, 576 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)
(recognizing that expression promoting gangs, like wearing a Hells Angels vest at a county fair,
may be offensive to some but nonetheless warrants constitutional protection).
154. Reno, 521 U.S. at 874.
155. Id. at885.
156. Id. at 874 (finding that the overbreadth of the CDA resulted in the unconstitutional
prohibition of adult access to indecent material).
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The First Amendment right to free expression stands as one of the hallmark
principles of American democracy. Expression often involves controversial
issues and conduct that may arouse anger, hostility, and confusion from those
who receive or oppose the message. Nonetheless, speech-including
expressive conduct-is protected by the First Amendment, and the government
cannot arbitrarily regulate it.
Although it is unclear what, if any, positive functions gangs may serve in
society, the First Amendment safeguards gang members' freedom of speech.'
58
Courts must protect Internet gang-related expression by adhering to the
precedent set forth by the jurisprudence in this area-that is, offensive and
hateful messages must remain protected in order to maintain the guarantee of
free expression for all. A statute wrought with ambiguity and an overly broad
application that suffocates expression cannot stand; thus, Florida Statutes
section 874.11 must fall.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 88-101.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 126-57.
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